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NOTE
Insider Trading Under Sarbanes-Oxley:
Bypassing the Personal Benefit Test
United States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2019)
Andrew J. Meyer*

I. INTRODUCTION
Insider trading is broadly defined as the use of material nonpublic
information in connection with the trade of stock or other securities.1 To
the average person, the classic case of insider trading is a corporate
executive reaping handsome personal profits by trading stock using insider
information that he obtained through his position within the corporation.
The reality, however, can be much more complicated.
While insider trading is generally illegal under federal law, the laws
regulating it do not explicitly mention the term “insider trading.”2 In
addition, not all forms of insider trading are prohibited.3 Instead, a series
of statutes and rules that prohibit fraud more generally are the basis for
prosecuting insider trading.4 Specifically, Section 10(b) of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) and Rule 10b-5, promulgated
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), bar persons from
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1. Akhilesh
Ganti,
Insider
Trading
(Feb.
25,
2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/insidertrading.asp
[https://perma.cc/LS3AET78].
2. Karen E. Woody, The New Insider Trading, 52 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 594, 600 (2020).
3. Id. at 596.
4. Id. at 597.
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committing fraud in connection with the sale or purchase of any security.5
Because those who engage in insider trading typically make no affirmative
representation when they trade securities, any “fraud” would have to
consist of a failure to speak in the face of a duty to do so. 6 Thus, the courts
have found insider trading liability where a person has a duty to speak
before trading but instead remains silent.7 In other words, an insider at a
corporation owes a duty to the shareholders of the corporation because he
is an agent of it.8 Therefore, the insider has a duty to disclose any material
nonpublic information to the person on the other end of the security
transaction prior to its completion.9 For example, the failure of a CEO to
publicly disclose the loss of a lucrative business opportunity prior to
selling his stock in the corporation would be fraud under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5.10
Insiders clearly have a duty to disclose; however, not all traders that
use material nonpublic information are insiders to a corporation.11 These
outsider traders generally receive information from an insider in the form
of a tip. To expand liability to these individuals, the United States
Supreme Court created the personal benefit test.12 The personal benefit
test determines when the recipient of a tip (“tippee”) inherits a duty to
disclose from the source of the tip (“tipper”).13 The test states that a tippee
inherits a duty when the tipper shares material nonpublic information for
personal benefit, and the tippee knows, or should know, that the tipper
breached his duty in sharing it.14
In 2002, Congress enacted a new securities fraud provision, 18
U.S.C. § 1348, under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“Sarbanes-Oxley”).15
Congress created this criminal statute in response to the scandals of Enron,

5. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(2)(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
6. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228–29 (1980). “One party to a
business transaction is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to disclose to the other
before the transaction is consummated…matters known to him that the other is entitled
to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence
between them….” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551 (1977).
7. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 861–62
(2d Cir. 1968).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See id.
12. See Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 663–64 (1983).
13. Id. at 662.
14. Woody, supra note 2, at 607–08.
15. Id. at 615.
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Global Crossing, Worldcom, and Adelphia, and it contains language
similar to that of Rule 10b-5.16 Section 1348 was largely ignored for years,
but a 2019 decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit brought it to the forefront.17 In United States v. Blaszczak, the
Second Circuit considered whether the personal benefit test should extend
to the newer Section 1348 securities provision. 18 There, a tipper and
tippees were charged with securities fraud under Rule 10b-5 and Section
1348.19 At trial, the jury acquitted the defendants of securities fraud under
Rule 10b-5, but convicted them under Section 1348.20 The trial court
instructed the jury to use the personal benefit test for the Rule 10b-5
charges but not for the Section 1348 charges.21 On appeal, the Second
Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision and held that when a person is
charged with securities fraud under Section 1348, the personal benefit test
from Rule 10b-5 securities fraud jurisprudence does not apply.22
16. Michael A. Perino, Enron’s Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the
Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 671,
671–72 (2002); Woody, supra note 2, at 616.
17. Woody, supra note 2, at 618–19.
18. United States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19, 26 (2d Cir. 2019).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 29.
22. Id. at 37. In September 2020, three of the defendants in Blaszczak petitioned
for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. See Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari and Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, Blaszczak v. United
States, 141 S.Ct. 1040 (2021) (No. 20-5649); On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit at 35, Olan v. United States,
141 S.Ct. 1040 (2021) (No. 20-306). The Court granted the petition on January 11,
2021, vacated the judgment, and remanded it back the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit. Blaszczak,141 S.Ct. at 1040; Olan, 141 S.Ct. at 1040. The
Court instructed the Second Circuit to further consider the case in light of Kelly v.
United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565 (2020). Blaszczak,141 S.Ct. at 1040; Olan, 141 S.Ct. at
1040. In Kelly, the Court held that a political revenge scheme by state officials to close
lanes on the George Washington Bridge in Fort Lee, New Jersey was an exercise of
regulatory power and not a scheme of money or property under 18 U.S.C. §§ 666,
1343 (2018). 140 S. Ct. at 1574. Kelly is important because there is a question in
Blaszczak as to whether confidential government information is property for the
purposes of the fraud statutes in Title 18. Id.; Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 34. In Blaszczak,
the defendants were convicted of fraud under Section 1343 in addition to 18 U.S.C. §
1348. 947 F.3d at 45. The Dissent in Blaszczak argued that confidential government
information is not property under the Title 18 fraud statutes. Id. at 47–48 (Kearse, J.,
dissenting). When vacating the judgment and remanding the case, the Court did not
instruct the Second Circuit to reconsider the other issue of Blaszczak which is the topic
of this Note. See 141 S.Ct. at 1040; Olan, 141 S.Ct. at 1040. That issue is whether the
personal benefit test applies to Section 1348. See Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 30–37. On
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This Note will discuss the history of insider trading law and analyze
the reasoning of the Second Circuit. Part II outlines the facts and holding
of Blaszczak, Part III analyzes the background and theories of insider
trading liability under Rule 10b-5 and Section 1348, and Part IV describes
the Second Circuit’s decision in Blaszczak. Finally, Part V critiques the
Second Circuit’s decision and suggests changes to the future of insider
trading law.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Between 2009 and 2014, defendants David Blaszczak, Theodore
Huber, Robert Olan, and Christopher Worrall engaged in two schemes to
pass and use confidential government information from the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) to make securities trades.23
Worrall worked at CMS, Blaszczak worked as a “political intelligence”
consultant for hedge funds, and Huber and Olan worked at Deerfield
Management, L.P., a healthcare-focused hedge fund.24
CMS is a federal agency within the United States Department of
Health and Human Services that manages and administers large
government health programs including Medicare, Medicaid, and the
Children’s Health Insurance Program.25 As a regulatory agency, the rules
CMS adopts affect businesses and organizations within the health
industry.26 Specifically, CMS determines reimbursement rates for medical
treatments covered by the health programs it manages.27

April 2, 2021, the Department of Justice filed a post-remand brief that conceded that,
in light of Kelly, confidential government information is not property under the Title
Title 18 fraud statutes. David E. Brodsky et. al., DOJ Concedes Error In Title 18
Insider Trading Convictions After Supreme Court’s “Bridgegate” Decision, CLEARLY
GOTTLIEB (Apr. 13, 2021), https://www.clearyenforcementwatch.com/2021/04/dojconcedes-error-in-title-18-insider-trading-convictions-after-supreme-courtsbridgegate-decision/ [https://perma.cc/FX6E-U5TB]. As a result, the Department of
Justice asked the Second Circuit to reverse the Title 18 convictions. Id. As of the time
of publication, it is unknown what will happen with the Second Circuit’s prior holding
on the personal benefit test because it does not need to revisit the issue if it reverses
the Title 18 convictions. Id.
23. Id. at 26.
24. Id.
25. Julia Kagan, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS),
INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 29, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/us-centersmedicare-and-medicaid-services-cms.asp [https://perma.cc/S8CQ-GMWY].
26. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 47 (Kearse, J., dissenting).
27. Id.
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The first scheme involved Blaszczak passing confidential
information from CMS about upcoming reimbursement rate changes for
medical treatments to Huber and Olan.28 Prior to becoming a hedge fund
consultant, Blaszczak worked at CMS along with fellow defendant
Worrall, one of Blaszczak’s sources.29 Defendants Huber and Olan
approached Blaszczak to obtain confidential CMS information because
they knew Blaszczak enjoyed unique access to this information through
his sources at the agency.30 On four separate occasions, Blaszczak passed
confidential information about pending reimbursement rate changes to
Huber and Olan, which they used to make stock trades on several
companies that would be affected by the changes.31 In one instance, Huber
and Olan received information from Blaszczak about a reduction in the
reimbursement rate for certain radiation oncology treatments.32 Huber and
Olan then used this confidential information to enter orders that “shorted”
approximately thirty-three million dollars’ worth of stock in a radiation
device manufacturer.33 When shorting a stock, a person bets that the stock
price will decrease and he profits when it does.34 In other words, Huber
and Olan bet that the manufacturer’s stock price would decrease after the
information became public, which, in this case, resulted in a profit of over
two million dollars.35 Huber and Olan believed that Blaszczak’s
information gave them an edge in the market, and through these trades,
Huber and Olan’s hedge fund accumulated approximately seven million

28. Id. at 27 (majority).
29. Id. at 26–27.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 27.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Shorting a stock or short selling is a trading strategy where a person hopes to
profit by betting that the stock price of a company will go down. Adam Hayes, Short
Selling,
INVESTOPEDIA
(Mar.
13,
2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/shortselling.asp
[https://perma.cc/B3W6ZMF3]. For example, Person A short sells by borrowing a stock from Person B and
selling it to Person C at the current market price. Id. Person A then plans to re-buy the
stock at a lower price, return it to Person B, and then pocket the difference. Id.
However, this is a highly speculative trading strategy that has a risk of unlimited loss
because a stock price can theoretically increase to infinity. Id. Therefore, if the stock
price does not decrease, Person A needs to buy the stock back at a higher price in order
to return the stock to Person B. Id.
35. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 27.
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dollars in profits.36 They described their relationship with Blaszczak as a
“money printing machine.”37
In the second scheme, which occurred around the same time as the
first, Blaszczak shared similar confidential information with Christopher
Plaford at another hedge fund.38 Like Huber and Olan, Plaford also
believed that the information provided by Blaszczak gave him an edge in
the market and that it was more accurate than that from other sources
because Blaszczak’s information originated from the “horse’s mouth.”39
Plaford used the confidential information to make trades similar to those
made by Huber and Olan.40 On one occasion, Plaford accumulated
approximately $330,000 in profit.41
The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) filed an eighteencount indictment related to these two trading schemes.42 The charges
included conspiracy centering on misappropriation of confidential
information, conversion of United States property, wire fraud, securities
fraud under Rule 10b-5, and securities fraud under Section 1348.43
The DOJ tried the case before a jury starting on April 2, 2018. 44
Because none of the defendants apart from Worrall owed a duty to speak
before trading, they would have to inherit such a duty under existing Rule
10b-5 precedents.45 Accordingly, the jury instructions for the Rule 10b-5
securities fraud counts included the personal benefit test.46 Specifically,
the trial court instructed the jury that in order to convict the defendants of
securities fraud under Rule 10b-5, the government needed to prove that
Worrall, who owed a duty to CMS as an employee, tipped confidential
information in exchange for a personal benefit, and that each of the other
defendants knew that Worrall disclosed the information in exchange for a
personal benefit.47 The trial court, however, denied the defendants’

36. Id. at 27–28.
37. Id. at 27.
38. Id. at 28. Plaford was a portfolio manager at Visium Asset Management, L.P.
who pleaded guilty and testified against Blaszczak as a cooperating witness. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 28–29.
43. Id. at 26, 29. The court in Blaszczak refers to § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as Title
15 securities fraud and refers to § 1348 as Title 18 securities fraud. Id. at 26.
44. Id. at 29.
45. Id. at 26 (Worrall was an employee of CMS and therefore owed a duty as an
agent while the others were outsiders and had no pre-existing duty).
46. Id. at 29.
47. Id.
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request to include the personal benefit test in the Section 1348 securities
fraud instructions.48 Instead, the trial court instructed the jury that in order
to convict the defendants of Section 1348 securities fraud, the government
needed to prove only that the defendants knowingly and willingly
participated in a fraudulent scheme to embezzle or convert confidential
information by “wrongfully taking the information and transferring it to
his own use or the use of someone else.”49 The jury instructions for the
Rule 10b-5 charges covered fourteen pages of the trial transcript and
included ten elements, whereas the Section 1348 instructions spanned
fewer than five pages.50 The jury returned a verdict on May 3, 2018, which
acquitted all defendants of the Rule 10b-5 securities charges, but convicted
Blaszczak, Huber, and Olan of the Section 1348 securities charges.51
On appeal to the Second Circuit, the defendants argued that the trial
court erred in refusing to include the personal benefit test in the jury
instructions for securities fraud under Section 1348.52 The court held that
when a person is charged with securities fraud under Section 1348, the
Rule 10b-5 personal benefit test does not apply.53

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In the United States, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and SEC
Rule 10b-5 are the primary bases for prosecuting insider trading. Over the
years, federal courts crafted insider trading law by interpreting Rule 10b5 to cover such conduct.54 More recently, the Section 1348 fraud provision
of Sarbanes-Oxley has also been used by the DOJ to prosecute insider
trading.55 This section will first discuss the history of insider trading under
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Antonia M. Apps & Katherine R. Goldstein, Can the Government
Circumvent “Newman’s” Personal Benefit Test?, 262 N.Y. L.J. 1, 2 (2019),
https://www.milbank.com/images/content/1/2/v2/126268/NYLJ-12.02.2019Milbank.pdf [https://perma.cc/K64V-SQRT].
51. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 29–30.
52. Id. The defendants challenged their convictions on several other grounds
arguing that (1) confidential CMS information is not property for the purposes of Title
18 wire and securities fraud, (2) the defendants’ convictions were affected by legal
and factual errors, (3) the evidence was insufficient, (4) there was a misjoinder of
counts for Blaszczak, and (5) the district court made evidentiary errors. Id. at 30.
53. Id. at 37.
54. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,
843 (2d Cir. 1968); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980); Dirks v.
S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
55. See, e.g., Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 29.
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Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, including the main theories for liability
developed by the courts. Then, it will address the fraud provision of
Section 1348.

A. Theories of Liability under SEC Rule 10b-5
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act prohibits those buying or selling
securities from using “any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in contravention” of rules or regulations prescribed by the SEC.56 In 1942,
the SEC adopted Rule 10b-5 based upon the authority of Section 10(b).57
Rule 10b-5 provides that it is unlawful for any person, either directly or
indirectly, to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.58 The SEC originally
adopted Rule 10b-5 to address securities fraud and not insider trading. In
the 1960s, however, the SEC started to use the rule to combat an increasing
number of insider trading cases.59
Over the years, the courts interpreted Rule 10b-5 to forbid insider
trading, and several of those pivotal cases provide the basic framework of
insider trading law today. Initially, the courts developed the Disclose or
Abstain Doctrine to cover any persons using material nonpublic
information.60 Then, they limited liability to only insiders with fiduciary

56. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (“It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange… [t]o use or employ, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange
or any security not so registered, or any securities-based swap agreement any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors . . . .”).
57. Zachary J. Gubler, Insider Trading As Fraud, 98 N.C. L. Rev. 533, 542
(2020).
58. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (“It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of
the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c)
To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.”).
59. Gubler, supra note 57, at 542–53.
60. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 843 (2d
Cir. 1968).
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duties under the Classical Theory.61 Next, they expanded liability to
outsiders without fiduciary duties by creating the personal benefit test.62
Finally, they created liability for complete outsiders to a company under
the Misappropriation Theory.63

1. The Early Days and the
Disclose or Abstain Doctrine
In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, a company performing exploratory
drilling on a parcel of land discovered valuable minerals.64 To facilitate
the acquisition of the property, the president of the company ordered the
exploration group to keep the results of the drilling confidential.65 The
president did not inform the company’s stock option committee or its
board of directors about the mineral find.66 Before the information became
public, several insiders at the company made stock trades based on the
information.67 From the time the drilling began to the time the information
became public, the stock price increased from approximately seventeen
dollars per share to over fifty-eight dollars per share.68 The SEC filed a
complaint against the insiders for violating Rule 10b-5. The trial court
found some of the insiders guilty and dismissed the charges against the
others.69 On appeal, however, the Second Circuit affirmed the findings of
guilt but reversed the dismissals.70 It held that anyone possessing material
inside information must either disclose the information before trading in
securities or abstain from trading if unable to disclose.71 The court
reasoned that the purpose of Rule 10b-5 was to ensure that all investors
should have relatively equal access to material information.72 The court
found that the defendants violated Rule 10b-5 by not disclosing the

61.
62.
63.
(1997).
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980).
See Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
See Carpenter v. U.S., 484 U.S. 19 (1987); U.S. v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642
Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 843.
Id.
Id. at 844.
Id.
Id. at 847.
Id. at 839, 842.
Id. at 842–43.
Id. at 848.
Id.
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information or abstaining from trading.73 This became known as the
Disclose or Abstain Doctrine.74

2. The Classical Theory of Insider
Trading and The Personal Benefit Test
The Disclose or Abstain Doctrine from Texas Gulf Sulphur remained
the primary rule regarding insider trading until the 1980s. 75 Subsequently,
two cases, Chiarella v. United States and Dirks v. SEC, reshaped insidertrading law by limiting liability from anyone possessing inside
information to only those who owe a fiduciary duty.76 This is known as
the Classical Theory of insider trading.77
In Chiarella, an employee of a printing company determined the
identity of corporations being targeted in takeover bids by examining
documents used in the process of printing takeover announcements.78
Using this information, and without disclosing it, Chiarella purchased
stock in the target corporations and immediately sold the stock after the
takeover bid was made public.79 Chiarella gained approximately $30,000
in profit over fourteen months through those trades.80 The trial court
convicted Chiarella on seventeen counts of violating Rule 10b-5, and he
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.81 The Court held that
Chiarella’s failure to disclose the information was not fraud under Rule
10b-5.82 The Court reasoned that, under common law, a failure to disclose
material information before a transaction is fraud only when there is a duty
to speak.83 In this instance, Chiarella had no duty because he was not an
agent of the target corporations, and therefore owed no duty to the
shareholders whose stock he purchased.84 Rather, Chiarella was a

73. Id.
74. See Woody, supra note 2, at 603.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 604.
77. Bradley J. Bondi & Steven D. Lofchie, The Law of Insider Trading: Legal
Theories, Common Defenses, and Best Practices for Ensuring Compliance, 8 N.Y.U.
J.L. & BUS. 151, 157 (2011).
78. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 225.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 228.
84. Id. at 232.
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“complete stranger” to his trading partners.85 For there to have been a duty
for Chiarella to speak, a duty to all participants in market transactions
would need to exist. 86 The Court declined to recognize such a duty
because doing so would depart “radically from the established doctrine
that duty arises from a specific relationship between two parties….”87 The
Court did not find any intent from Congress or the SEC to warrant such a
departure.88
Dirks v. SEC built upon Chiarella by creating the personal benefit
test for situations where an insider, a tipper, tips information to an outsider,
a tippee.89 In Dirks, Raymond Dirks, a securities analyst, received
information about accounting fraud at a corporation that sold life insurance
and mutual funds from Ronald Secrist, a former officer of the
corporation.90 Dirks investigated the fraud and disclosed his findings to
the Wall Street Journal which refused to publish the story.91 While Dirks
and his company did not trade on the corporation’s stock, Dirks openly
discussed his investigation with several clients and investors who used the
information to make trades.92 After the stock price began to fall
precipitously, the SEC filed a complaint against the corporation
committing accounting fraud and opened an investigation into Dirks.93 At
an administrative hearing, the SEC found that Dirks violated Rule 10b-5,
among other laws, by sharing the fraud allegations with the investor
community.94 The SEC reasoned that although Dirks was an outsider, and
therefore did not have an existing fiduciary duty to the corporation, Dirks
inherited Secrist’s fiduciary duty by knowingly receiving the
information.95 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit affirmed the SEC’s findings.96
The United States Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit’s ruling,
finding that Dirks did not violate Rule 10b-5 because Secrist did not
receive a personal benefit for disclosing the information.97 The Court’s
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 232–33.
Id. at 233.
Id.
Id.
Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
Id. at 648–49.
Id. at 649–50.
Id. at 649.
Id. at 650.
Id. at 650–51.
Id. at 655–56.
Id. at 652.
Id. at 652.
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analysis initially reaffirmed the holding in Chiarella in that there cannot
be a violation of Rule 10b-5 unless there is a breach of a duty.98 However,
the Court stated that a tippee does not acquire a duty merely by receiving
material nonpublic information from an insider who does owe a duty. 99
Instead, the tippee inherits a duty by receiving the information
improperly.100 This occurs when (1) an insider-tipper breaches his duty by
sharing the information, and (2) the tippee knows or should have known
there has been a breach by the insider.101
The Court then turned to the question of what constitutes a breach on
the part of the insider.102 In answering that question, the Court noted that
not all disclosures of material nonpublic information constitute a breach
of the insider’s duty to the shareholders.103 The Court explained that in
some cases, whether information is material and whether it is nonpublic,
might not be apparent to an insider.104 The Court acknowledged that the
purpose of the securities laws is to eliminate the use of material nonpublic
information for personal advantage.105 Thus, the Court reasoned that an
insider must receive a personal gain either directly or indirectly for there
to be a breach of duty, and if there is no breach of duty by the insider, then
there is no breach by the tippee.106 In this case, the Court held that neither
Secrist, Dirks, nor Dirks’s clients committed insider trading because
Secrist did not gain a personal benefit for tipping off Dirks, which meant
that neither Dirks nor his clients who traded inherited a duty to disclose
the information before trading.107
The preceding cases, among others, created doctrines known as the
Classical Theory of insider trading and the personal benefit test for
inheriting a duty to speak before trading. As exemplified by Chiarella,
the Classical Theory holds that an insider commits insider trading by
failing to disclose his material nonpublic information to a trading partner
to whom the insider owes a duty to disclose. 108 The personal benefit test,
shown by Dirks, holds that a tippee inherits the duty of the tipper when the
tippee knows or should have known that the tipper breached his duty by
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id at 654.
Id. at 660.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 661.
Id. at 661–62.
Id. at 662.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 666–67.
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980).
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providing material nonpublic information in exchange for a personal
benefit.109

3. The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading
While the classical theory and the personal benefit test covered
situations where an insider breaches his fiduciary duty by either using the
information or tipping it to another for personal benefit, another theory of
insider trading emerged after Chiarella and Dirks.110
The
misappropriation theory developed to cover situations where an outsider
breaches a duty arising out of a relationship of trust or confidence and he
misappropriates and uses material nonpublic information in a securities
transaction.111 In contrast to the classical theory, the misappropriation
theory involves fraud against the source of the material nonpublic
information instead of the buyer or seller of a security.112
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the
misappropriation theory as applied to Rule 10b-5 in Carpenter v. United
States.113 In Carpenter, a reporter wrote a daily column in the Wall Street
Journal that discussed selected stocks and gave a positive or negative
analysis about them.114 The information and the analysis in the column
did not come from an insider at a corporation, but the column had the
potential to impact stock prices after publication.115 The Journal had a
policy that the contents of the column were its property and that they were
to remain confidential before publication.116 The reporter and other
defendants, however, entered into a scheme to pass along the column’s
contents and to make trades upon it. 117 In total, the defendants made a
profit of approximately $690,000.118
109. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660. The tipper in such a situation is liable because sharing
material nonpublic information to obtain a personal benefit is tantamount to trading
on the information; the personal benefit test is merely a substitute for trading gains.
Id. at 663–64.
110. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232; Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660.
111. George F. Gabel, Jr., Annotation, Who may be liable under
“misappropriation theory” of imposing duty to disclose or abstain from trading under
§ 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b)) and SEC Rule 10b–
5 (17 CFR § 240.10b–5), 114 A.L.R. Fed. 323 (1993).
112. Id.
113. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
114. Id. at 22.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 23.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York and the Second Circuit found the reporter guilty of violating Rule
10b-5 because he breached his duty of confidentiality to the Journal by
misappropriating the column’s confidential contents.119 Both courts
reasoned that, although the Journal was not a buyer or seller of stock in
these transactions, the Journal was the victim of the fraud and the fraud
fell within the definition of Rule 10b-5 because it was “in connection with”
the purchase or sale of securities.120 On appeal to the United States
Supreme Court, the justices split equally on the question of whether Rule
10b-5 reached the defendant’s conduct and that equal division resulted in
affirmance of the Second Circuit’s decision.121
In addition to the charges under Rule 10b-5, the reporter in Carpenter
was also charged with and convicted of mail and wire fraud under Title 18
of the United States Code.122 The mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341,
and the wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, each prohibit a scheme or
artifice to defraud by means of the mail or by wire, radio, or television.123
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that
the conspiracy to trade in the Journal’s confidential information fell within
the mail and wire fraud statutes.124 The Court reasoned that the Title 18

119. Id. at 23–24.
120. Id. at 24.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 21.
123. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (“Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any
scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan,
exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use
any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything
represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for
the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any
post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to
be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits or causes to be deposited any
matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by any private or commercial
interstate carrier, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or
knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or such carrier according to the direction
thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom
it is addressed, any such matter or thing….”) (emphasis added); see also 18 U.S.C. §
1343 (“Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire,
radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings,
signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or
artifice….”) (emphasis added).
124. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 27–28.
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mail and wire fraud statutes reach any scheme that uses false or fraudulent
pretenses to deprive another of his money or property.125 The Court stated
that the term “defraud” in the Title 18 statutes had a common
understanding of wronging a person of his property rights by dishonest
schemes and that fraud includes the act of embezzlement which is a
fraudulent appropriation of money or goods for personal use by a person
entrusted to care for the money or goods.126 It also stated that “a person
who acquires special knowledge or information by virtue of a confidential
or fiduciary relationship with another is not free to exploit that knowledge
or information for his own personal benefit but must account to his
principal for any profits derived therefrom.”127 Thus, while the Court in
Carpenter did not explicitly endorse the misappropriation theory as
applied to fraud in Rule 10b-5, it unanimously adopted the
misappropriation or embezzlement theory as it applies to fraud in the Title
18 statutes.128
The United States Supreme Court revisited the question of whether
the misappropriation theory applies to Rule 10b-5 in United States v.
O’Hagan.129 In O’Hagan, a partner in a law firm obtained confidential
information regarding a client’s offer to purchase another corporation.130
The partner did not represent the client, but received the information from
fellow partners working with the client.131 The partner used this
information to purchase stock options in the target corporation, which
resulted in profits of more than four million dollars. 132 A jury found the
partner guilty of violating Rule 10b-5, but the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that liability under Rule
10b-5 cannot be grounded on the misappropriation theory of securities
fraud.133
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit on this
last point.134 The Court reasoned that the misappropriation theory satisfied
Rule 10b-5’s requirement that there be a “deceptive device” in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities.135 The Court described the fraud in
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 27.
Id.
Id. at 27–28.
Id.
521 U.S. 642 (1997).
Id. at 647.
Id.
Id. at 647–48.
Id. at 649.
Id. at 650.
Id. at 653.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,

15

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 3 [], Art. 10

966

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

Rule 10b-5 as of the “same species” as the fraud of the Title 18 mail and
wire fraud statutes addressed in Carpenter.136 It acknowledged the
Carpenter Court’s observation that the misappropriation of confidential
information in violation of a fiduciary duty is fraud akin to
embezzlement.137 In clarifying that the misappropriator’s deception
consists of pretending loyalty to the source of the information while
converting that source’s information for personal gain, the Court in
O’Hagan explicitly applied the misappropriation theory of insider trading
to Rule 10b-5.138

B. Securities Fraud Under Section 1348
In 2002, the United States Congress created a new securities fraud
provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1348, modeled after the Title 18 mail and wire fraud
provisions discussed above.139 Section 1348 prohibits the use of any
scheme or artifice to defraud any person in connection with any security
and forbids obtaining any security through false or fraudulent pretenses.140
Congress created Section 1348 through the passage of the SarbanesOxley Act.141 After the implosion of Enron and a string of other scandals
involving Global Crossing, Worldcom, and Adelphia, legislators crafted
Sarbanes-Oxley at “lightning speed” amongst a political firestorm, a
falling Dow Jones Industrial Average, and an election year, which all led

136. Id. at 654.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 653–54. Justice Ginsburg notes in the opinion that the fraud in a
misappropriation case consists of “feigning fidelity to the source of information.” Id.
at 655.
139. Woody, supra note 2, at 615; see supra note 123 (text of Title 18 mail and
wire fraud statutes).
140. See 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (“Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute,
a scheme or artifice—(1) to defraud any person in connection with any commodity for
future delivery, or any option on a commodity for future delivery, or any security of
an issuer with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78l) or that is required to file reports under section
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o(d)); or (2) to obtain, by
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, any money or
property in connection with the purchase or sale of any commodity for future delivery,
or any option on a commodity for future delivery, or any security of an issuer with a
class of securities registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(15 U.S.C. 78l) or that is required to file reports under section 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o(d)); shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned
not more than 25 years, or both.”).
141. Woody, supra note 2, at 615.
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to its near unanimous passage.142 The collapse of Enron and its auditor,
Arthur Anderson LLP, politically weakened two groups affected by the
legislation, the business community and the accounting profession.143 As
a result, “[t]he healthy ventilation of issues that occurs in the usual giveand-take negotiations over competing policy positions, which works to
improve the quality of decisionmaking [sic], did not occur in the case of
[Sarbanes-Oxley].”144 Legislators did not attempt to reconcile their policy
proposals with conflicting literature nor did they follow up on comments
that “hinted at the existence of studies inconsistent with those
[proposals].”145 Furthermore, legislators typically sympathetic to the
business community acquiesced and determined “that it would be
politically perilous to be perceived as obstructing the legislative process
and portrayed as being on the wrong side of the issue.”146 These
circumstances resulted in a disorganized statute that spanned 150 pages of
text and affected three separate titles of federal law.147 The Act also
created provisions that were duplicative and inconsistent with existing
laws.148 As one commentator stated, “it is reasonable to expect, as with
other recent securities legislation, that significant unintended
consequences will arise.”149
According to a Senate Report from the Judiciary Committee on
Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress added Section 1348 to provide a provision in
the criminal code through which securities fraud could be prosecuted.150
Before Sarbanes-Oxley, prosecutors relied upon either existing mail and
wire fraud charges or specific existing securities laws or regulations such
as Rule 10b-5 that contained technical legal requirements.151 These
methods proved to be challenging because prosecutors had to prove use of
the mail or wires to carry out the fraud, and defendants could rebut
arguments they possessed the requisite criminal intent with technical legal
requirements.152

142. Perino, supra note 16, at 671–72.
143. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1528 (2005).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Perino, supra note 16, at 672.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 674.
150. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 2 (2002).
151. Id. at 6.
152. Id.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,

17

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 3 [], Art. 10

968

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

The Senate Report on Sarbanes-Oxley contained several statements
speaking to the purpose and requirements of the new securities statute. 153
The report stated
[a]lthough we believe that existing criminal statutes are adequate to
prosecute criminal acts involving securities fraud, we support the
creation of a new securities fraud offense. In our view this provision
will make it easier, in a limited class of cases, for prosecutors to prove
securities fraud by eliminating, for example, the element that the mails
or wires were used to further the scheme to defraud.154

The report further asserted that “[t]he provision would supplement
the patchwork of existing technical securities law violations with a more
general and less technical provision, with elements and intent
requirements comparable to current bank fraud and health care fraud
statutes.”155 Section 1348 would not lower the standard of criminal intent
needed to convict securities fraud offenders.156 Consistent with existing
bank, health care, and securities fraud statutes, prosecutors would need to
prove that a “defendant knowingly engaged in a scheme or artifice to
defraud, or knowingly made false statements or representations to obtain
money in a securities transaction.”157
The intent of Congress in enacting Section 1348 and the species of
embezzlement discussed in Carpenter became significant factors to the
court in Blaszczak.158

IV. INSTANT DECISION
In United States v. Blaszczak, the Second Circuit held that the
personal benefit test from Rule 10b-5’s tipping jurisprudence does not
apply in cases in which a person is charged with securities fraud under
Section 1348.159 The Second Circuit began its analysis by comparing the
wording of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to Section 1348 and the fraud
153. Id. at 2, 32–38.
154. Id. at 30.
155. Id at 14.
156. Id. at 30.
157. Id.
158. 18 U.S.C. § 1348; Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26–28 (1987);
United States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19, 32–36 (2d Cir. 2019).
159. 947 F.3d 19, 37 (2d Cir. 2019). The Dissent, which will not be discussed in
this Note, argued that the charges against the defendants should not be affirmed
because the information misappropriated by the defendants was not property for the
purposes of the fraud statutes. Id. at 46 (Kearse, J., dissenting).
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prohibited by each of them.160 First, it noted that while none of the existing
statutes mentioned a personal benefit test, the provisions shared “similar
text” and prohibited certain schemes to defraud.161 One such scheme is
the misappropriation theory of fraud.162
Next, the Second Circuit discussed the origin of the personal benefit
test and linked it specifically to Section 10(b).163 It noted that Congress’s
intention in creating Section 10(b) was to protect the free flow of
information in the securities markets while eliminating the use of insider
information for personal advantage.164 The court acknowledged that Dirks
accomplished this by holding that an insider did not breach his fiduciary
duty by tipping the information unless he received a personal benefit.165
The Second Circuit cited two cases in addition to Dirks, holding that the
personal benefit test derives from Rule 10b-5 and is consistent with the
purposes of securities laws.166
The Second Circuit then discussed the embezzlement theory of fraud
used in Carpenter.167 The court stated that once the personal benefit test
is “untethered” from the statutory context of Section 10(b), the test finds
no support in the embezzlement theory of fraud advanced by Carpenter.168
The court reasoned that, in embezzlement, there is no additional
requirement that an insider breach a duty to the owner of the information
because it is impossible to embezzle money without committing a fraud.169
Thus, the court noted that, because a breach of duty is inherent in the
embezzlement theory from Carpenter, there is no additional requirement
that the government prove a breach, let alone prove that an insider tipped
the information for a personal benefit.170 Therefore, the court concluded
that the personal benefit test is not grounded in the embezzlement theory
of fraud and it depends entirely upon the intent of the Exchange Act.171

160. Id. at 35.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. (quoting Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983)).
165. Id. (citing Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662–64).
166. Id. at 35–36 (citing Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662–64); United States v. Chestman,
947 F.2d 551, 581 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Pinto-Thomaz, 352 F. Supp. 3d
287, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)).
167. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 36 (citing Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26–
28 (1987)).
168. Id. (citing Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 26–28).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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Next, the Second Circuit concluded that the embezzlement theory
advanced by Carpenter applied to securities fraud under Section 1348.172
To assess congressional intent in creating Section 1348, the court
examined the Senate Judiciary Report for Sarbanes-Oxley.173 Quoting the
report, the court noted that Congress passed Section 1348 to supplement
the existing patchwork of securities law provisions with a less technical
and a more general provision with elements – including intent
requirements – similar to the existing bank and healthcare fraud statutes.174
The court concluded that the purpose of Section 1348 was to provide
prosecutors with a different and broader enforcement mechanism than
Rule 10b-5 to address securities fraud.175 As a result, the court declined to
extend the personal benefit test to Section 1348 because it does not share
the same statutory purpose as Section 10(b).176
Finally, the court rejected the defendants’ policy arguments in favor
of extending the personal benefit test to Section 1348.177 The defendants
argued that if the test was not extended to Section 1348, prosecutors would
be able to prosecute insider trading with less difficulty by bypassing the
personal benefit test altogether.178 However, this argument failed to
persuade the court, which reasoned that Congress possessed the power to
create a broader securities fraud provision and that it was not the role of
the courts to “check that decision on policy grounds.”179
Ultimately, the court concluded that the personal benefit test should
not be extended to Section 1348 because it does not find support in the
embezzlement theory of fraud in Carpenter and because Section 1348
serves a different statutory purpose than Section 10(b).180

V. COMMENT
While the decision in Blaszczak streamlined insider trading
prosecution by making it easier for the government to prove guilt, it
simultaneously complicated the relevant law by upending decades of
carefully crafted judicial precedent and sowing confusion among

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id.
Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 6 (2002)).
Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 6 (2002)).
Id. at 36–37.
Id.
Id. at 37.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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securities professionals.181 Additionally, the two arguments put forth by
the Second Circuit to support its decision not to extend the personal benefit
test to Section 1348 have weaknesses. Lastly, a policy argument can be
made against the result in this case.

A. The Second Circuit Streamlined Prosecution but Complicated
Existing Law
By refusing to extend the personal benefit test to Section 1348, the
Second Circuit reduced the burden on the government of proving insider
trading and simplified the process of prosecuting it.182 Rather than using
Rule 10b-5, prosecutors can use Section 1348 to bypass the personal
benefit test altogether.183 In future prosecutions, based upon the jury
instructions in Blaszczak, the government would only need to prove that a
defendant knowingly and willingly participated in a fraudulent scheme to
embezzle or convert confidential information.184 This change is further
evidenced by the nearly ten-page difference in the length of the jury
instructions used for Rule 10b-5 and Section 1348.185 It is not a stretch to
believe that a jury of persons with little to no experience in securities law
will have an easier time understanding the much shorter instructions of
Section 1348. In determining guilt under Section 1348, the jury will not
have to enter the mind of the defendants to determine whether the tipper
received a personal benefit by tipping the information or whether the
tippee knew or should have known that the tipper breached his duty.186
The Dirks Court itself acknowledged the difficulty of proving a personal
benefit, observing that “[d]etermining whether an insider personally
benefits from a particular disclosure, a question of fact, will not always be
easy for courts.”187
Despite this simplification, the Second Circuit also complicated
insider trading law. Because of the result in Blaszczak, there are now two

181. See id.
182. See id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 29.
185. Apps & Goldstein, supra note 50, at 2.
186. See id. Whereas the United States Supreme Court in Dirks requires proof that
the tippee know or should know that the tipper divulged confidential information for
personal benefit, the Second Circuit requires proof that the tippee must know.
Compare Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983), with United States v. Newman,
773 F.3d 438, 450 (2d Cir. 2014), abrogated by Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct.
420 (2016).
187. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,

21

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 3 [], Art. 10

972

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

ways in which a person could be liable for insider trading.188 The first
method is via the traditional route using Rule 10b-5 by either a civil
proceeding brought by the SEC or a criminal proceeding brought by the
DOJ.189 The second method allows the DOJ to bring criminal charges
under Section 1348.190 Though both methods attempt to accomplish the
same goal of combatting insider trading, each achieves it in different way,
which results in differing outcomes.191 This is exemplified in Blaszczak
by the opposing rulings on the Rule 10b-5 and Section 1348 charges.192
The investor community has expressed similar concerns over this
decision.193 The Alternative Investment Management Association,194 in
support of a rehearing en banc by the Second Circuit, argued that the ruling
in Blaszczak creates “uncertainty and overdeterrence by removing a
longstanding and well-known limitation” in the personal benefit test.195
Although the Association agreed with the Second Circuit that the text of
Section 1348 is materially identical to the text of Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5, the Association argued that determining the source of information
in connection with making trades can be difficult to ascertain in a practical
sense.196 It posited that the lack of clarity stemming from upending
decades of precedent can create significant compliance costs, lead to
inefficiency in market trading, and deter the use of lawfully obtained
information.197 This argument is similar to the sentiment of the Dirks

188. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 37.
189. Brett Atanasio, Mark Cahn, Elizabeth Mitchell, Theresa Titolo & Wilmer
Hale, Insider Trading Law Alert: The Second Circuit Clears the Path for Insider
Trading Convictions Absent a Dirks Personal Benefit, JD SUPRA (Jan. 8, 2020),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/insider-trading-law-alert-the-second-82209/
[https://perma.cc/E4YH-WCRZ].
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 36–37.
193. See Brief of Amicus Curiae the Alternative Investment Management
Association, Ltd. in Support of Rehearing En Banc at 1, United States v. Blaszczak,
947 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2019) (No. 18-2811), 2020 WL 1040817, at *1.
194. “The Alternative Investment Management Association (AIMA) is the global
representative of the alternative investment industry, with around 2,000 corporate
members in over 60 countries. AIMA’s fund manager members collectively manage
more than $2 trillion in hedge fund and private credit assets.” About AIMA, AIMA,
https://www.aima.org/about.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2020).
195. Brief of Amicus Curiae the Alternative Investment Management Association,
Ltd. in Support of Rehearing En Banc at 6, Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2019) (No.
18-2811), 2020 WL 1040817, at 6.
196. Id. at 5–6.
197. Id.
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Court, which stated that “it is essential…to have a guiding principle for
those whose daily activities must be limited and instructed by the SEC’s
inside-trading rules.”198
Beyond simply complicating existing law, the decision of the
Blaszczak court also defies sound public policy.199 Having similarlyworded statutes that punish analogous conduct differently does not make
sense and leads to confusion and a lack of understanding by the public of
what is and is not a lawful use of information. After forty years of judicial
precedent creating insider trading law, it may be time for Congress to step
in and properly enact a statute dedicated specifically to insider trading.
Forty years of judicial decisions should give Congress enough test cases
to create a provision that clearly delineates what is unlawful and details
the proper tests for determining liability.

B. The Second Circuit’s Two Arguments Have Weaknesses
In concluding that the personal benefit test does not apply to Section
1348, the Blaszczak court relied primarily upon a single quote from the
Senate Judiciary Report for Sarbanes-Oxley.200 The quoted portion of the
report stated that Section 1348 would “supplement the patchwork of
existing technical securities law violations with a more general and less
technical provision, with elements and intent requirements comparable to
current bank fraud and health care fraud statutes.”201 The language of the
quoted statement is ambiguous and narrow in scope. What Congress
meant when it said that this provision would supplement existing securities
laws is arguably unclear. As discussed above, the practical effect of
Section 1348 is to provide a bypass around the personal benefit test.202 It
seems unlikely that Congress’s idea of supplementing a law is to render a
portion of the law unnecessary. The language is also narrow in its scope
in that it only refers to Section 1348 having similar elements and intent
requirements to bank and health care fraud statutes.203 It does not make

198. Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983).
199. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 36–37.
200. Id. at 36.
201. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 14 (2002).
202. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 36–37.
203. See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 30 (2002) (“Like the bank and health care fraud
statutes on which this provision is modeled, prosecutors must prove that a defendant
knowingly engaged in a scheme or artifice to defraud, or knowingly made false
statements or representations to obtain money in a securities transaction.”).
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any reference to current judicial doctrines in the existing securities laws,
and it does not affirmatively discard any of them.204
Furthermore, the quoted language becomes even less persuasive
when viewed in the context of the rest of the report. The report stated that
Congress believed that existing securities fraud statues were adequate.
However, it supported the creation of Section 1348 to make it easier to
prosecute securities fraud in a “limited class of cases.”205 It seems
speculative that Congress’s idea of a limited class of cases included
essentially all cases of securities fraud, as there is nothing to prevent the
DOJ from using Section 1348 in every insider trading case going forward.
In fact, one example given by the report as a reason for Section 1348 was
the elimination of the requirement that the government prove the
defendant used the mail or wires to conduct the fraud.206 This example
shows that Congress may have intended a more targeted approach rather
than a wholesale change in securities law.
While reasonable minds may disagree as to the meaning of the
language of the Senate report, the circumstances under which Congress
created Section 1348 also calls into question what the actual intent of
Congress was. As previously mentioned, Congress created Section 1348
at “lightning speed”, amongst a political firestorm, in an election year,
with a falling stock market, and in response to the financial scandals of
Enron and others.207 Sarbanes-Oxley spanned 150 pages and created
duplicative and inconsistent provisions scattered across three separate
titles of federal law.208 It is also important to note that the financial
scandals prompting Sarbanes-Oxley involved primarily accounting fraud
and not insider trading.209 In its haste, it is a possible that Congress did
204. See generally id.
205. Id. at 30.
206. Id.
207. Perino, supra note 16, at 671–72.
208. Id.
209. Rosemary Carlson, The Enron Scandal That Prompted the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act,
BALANCE
SMALL
BUS.
(Nov.
16,
2019),
https://www.thebalancesmb.com/sarbanes-oxley-act-and-the-enron-scandal-393497
[https://perma.cc/D75Q-QTB4]. Enron inflated profits and hid losses through dubious
accounting practices that included unrealized future gains in current income
statements and transferred troubled assets into limited partnerships. Peter Bondarenko,
Enron Scandal, BRITANNICA (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.britannica.com/event/Enronscandal. WorldCom exaggerated its profits by inflating its net income and cash flows
by recording expenses as investments. Adam Hayes, The Rise and Fall of WorldCom,
INVESTOPEDIA (May 5, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/w/worldcom.asp
[https://perma.cc/JQ6K-PTT5]. Officers of Adelphia Communications used
approximately $2.3 billion in company funds for personal use and lied to investors
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not realize the ramifications of its actions. These circumstances call into
doubt the notion that Congress appreciated the significance of Section
1348 or understood that it would upend decades of securities law
jurisprudence.
The Second Circuit’s second argument that the personal benefit test
is not required in the embezzlement theory of fraud is questionable. The
Blaszczak court reasoned that the embezzlement theory did not require
proof of a personal benefit or proof of a breach of duty because
embezzlement is always fraudulent.210 However, as argued in an amicus
brief for the defense by law professors specializing in securities law, the
cases on which the Blaszczak court relied in its embezzlement reasoning,
Carpenter and O’Hagan, involved situations where the defendant already
had a fiduciary duty and breached that duty by using the information. 211
In Carpenter, an employee used an employer’s confidential
information.212 In O’Hagan, an attorney used confidential information
from a firm’s client.213 Neither case addressed a situation where the
defendant did not already owe a duty to disclose, so there is little for the
Second Circuit to base its argument on. At a minimum, O’Hagan and
Carpenter evidence that the United States Supreme Court implicitly, if not
explicitly, requires a breach of a duty in the embezzlement theory. 214 In
Blaszczak, because Blaszczak, Huber, and Olan owed no duty to CMS as
outsiders, it seems that the personal benefit test would be necessary to
determine whether a duty was inherited from Worrall, as an employee at
CMS.215 The Court’s silence in Carpenter and O’Hagan cannot be
definitive proof of the Blaszczak court’s argument.216

about the company’s financial condition. Barry Meier, Corporate Conduct: The
Overview; 2 Guilty in Fraud at a Cable Giant, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2004),
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/09/business/corporate-conduct-the-overview-2guilty-in-fraud-at-a-cable-giant.html [https://perma.cc/7J6Q-NSPR].
210. United States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19, 36 (2d Cir. 2019).
211. Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Defendant-Appellants’
Petition for Rehearing and for Rehearing En Banc at 9–10, Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19 (2d
Cir. 2019); see United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647 (1997); Carpenter v.
United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27 (1987).
212. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 23–24.
213. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647–48.
214. Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Defendant-Appellants’
Petition for Rehearing and for Rehearing En Banc at 9–10, Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19 (2d
Cir. 2019).
215. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 26–28.
216. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); Blaszczak,
947 F.3d at 30–45.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In Blaszczak, the Second Circuit upended decades of jurisprudence
surrounding Rule 10b-5 and insider trading when it held that the personal
benefit test does not apply to situations where a defendant is charged with
securities fraud under Section 1348.217 The court’s decision complicates
existing insider trading law by punishing similar conduct differently under
either Rule 10b-5 or Section 1348, even while providing an easier path
for prosecutors by allowing them to bypass the personal benefit test
altogether.

217. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 37.
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